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Abstract 
In this paper we describe a new, lightweight security mechanism for PSTN-VoIP cooperation that is based on two 
information hiding techniques: digital watermarking and steganography. Proposed scheme is especially suitable for 
PSTN-IP-PSTN (toll-by-passing) scenario which nowadays is very popular application of IP Telephony systems. 
With the use of this mechanism we authenticate end-to-end transmitted voice between PSTN users. Additionally we 
improve IP part traffic security (both media stream and VoIP signalling messages). Exemplary scenario is presented 
for SIP signalling protocol along with SIP-T extension and H.248/Megaco protocol.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) voice services are characterized by three important 
parameters: good voice quality, high reliability and security. We are able to provide critical services such as 
emergency numbers or federal agencies with ability for lawful intercept. All of these issues should be addressed 
before VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) systems are deployed on mass scale and the security become the most 
critical area [5]. With the deployment of IP Telephony accelerating, comes the increasing need to find ways to 
effectively secure it and to make it as secure as PSTN. That is why in IP network environment, especially for real-
time services like VoIP, it has become desirable to develop security mechanisms which efficiently utilize available 
resources. 
Current IP network’s security solutions are usually based on deployment of a number of security devices and 
applications to protect and monitor networks such as: firewalls, Intrusion Detection (Prevention) Systems (IDS/IPS), 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN), authentication services and anti-virus software etc. Paradoxically, VoIP is highly 
sensitive to delay, packet loss and jitter, making these security mechanisms inadequate. Another challenge is that 
there must be a cooperation between security measures for IP Telephony. The lack of it is making protecting IP 
Telephony service ineffective from more sophisticated attacks or internal threats. So if we consider sending the calls 
in PSTN-IP-PSTN  scenario, which is nowadays one of the most popular application for IP Telephony systems, we 
must emphasize that the IP part there is the weakest one from the security point of view. 
That is why to adjust those two different environments we propose a new, lightweight security mechanism for 
PSTN-VoIP cooperation based on digital watermarking and steganography, so we can establish a reasonable tradeoff 
between security and performance even for low-bandwidth environment. 
 
2. MOTIVATION 
First we would like to emphasize that it is not enough to protect the media stream exchanged between the calling 
parties. This leads to a situation, in which the two entities are able to talk each other in a secure manner, but they are 
unable to initiate a call because of an attacker’s actions on the signalling protocol. Usually, the users do not realize 
how much the weak security of signalling protocol, or its absence, can impact the security of the whole system. They 
often only demand their conversations be confidential and not revealed to the third-party. 
As we mentioned in Section 1 the real problem for cooperation between legacy and new voice systems is securing IP 
Telephony part of PSTN-IP-PSTN connections. We should “seal” VoIP security gaps, so it will not affect the PSTN 
part. That is why, in this paper, we are proposing a different approach to the PSTN-VoIP security, based on digital 
watermarking. Our motivation to increase security for PSTN-VoIP interconnections is based on the following facts: 
- There is a need for security mechanism for PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario to adjust security of the IP part to PSTN part, 
- There is a need for low-power computing and low-bandwidth consuming mechanism for real-time services like 
VoIP to ensure certain level of security without affecting performance, 
– There are no standardized security solutions for interworking between different signalling protocols, e.g. ISUP and 
SIP or even SIP and H.323. Every signalling protocol use disjoint set of security mechanisms. In PSTN-IP-PSTN 
scenario we must ensure that PSTN signaling messages as well as conversation will be transmitted in a secure 
manner during traveling through the IP environment, 
– It is hard to secure VoIP system based on one VoIP signaling protocol [5] and providing secure interworking in 
PSTN-VoIP scenario is much more complex,  
– VoIP security is still evolving. Lately, a large number of new security mechanisms was standardized for IP 
Telephony especially those for securing signalling messages but they often have certain disadvantages (like the big 
overhead in S/MIME for SIP or the use of TLS only for TCP, whereas traffic is carried mostly by UDP). So the 
process is not finished and still it is time for new solutions and ideas especially for securing PSTN-VoIP 
interworking, 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 general idea of proposed solution is presented. Then in 
Section 4 the mechanism’s operations in IP network and PSTN part of the PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario are presented. 
Next in Section 5 security services that we gain with the use of this solution are outlined. Finally, we end with 
conclusions in Section 6. 
3.  GENERAL IDEA OF PROPOSED SOLUTION 
We proposed using digital watermarking and network steganography techniques to improve VoIP security in [1], [2] 
and [3]. In [1] we used digital watermarking to authenticate VoIP conversation as well as messages of the signalling 
protocol that IP Telephony is based on. In [2] we used covert channel created in voice to alternate RTCP protocol 
functionality and additionally to provide security of VoIP conversation. In this solution we combined both 
information hiding techniques mentioned earlier. In [3] general description of protocol that uses multipurpose covert 
channel in VoIP transmission was defined. Network steganography was used to transmit the header and digital 
watermarking was used to transmit payload of protocol’s PDU (Protocol Data Unit). 
Here we propose to combine proposed solutions to improve security in PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario. The main idea is to 
authenticate conversation end-to-end (between PSTN users) with the watermark embedded into the voice and 
additionally use network steganography and digital watermarking in the in IP environment to ensure VoIP signaling 
protocol and ISUP (PSTN signalling protocol) security. So in this solution we will embed two watermarks into the 
voice stream: one at the PSTN endpoint, second at the entrance to the IP part of the network. The watermarking 
technique that is used must allow to embed/extract two different watermarks without distortion or destroying the 
existing ones. That means that we will be watermarking already watermarked voice stream. 
The solution general idea is also presented in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed solution general operation idea 
 
We will reference and describe the above figure in the next sections. In next two sections we will describe in details 
proposed solution for IP then PSTN part of the PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario. 
 
4. THE IP PART OF PSTN-IP-PSTN SCENARIO 
In this section we will focus only on the part of Fig.1 that is marked with 2 . We will demonstrate the IP part of the 
solution based on SIP protocol [6] and its extension SIP-T [7], because it is nowadays one of the most popular 
signalling protocol for IP Telephony. SIP-T (SIP for Telephones) is an extension to SIP protocol that allows it to be 
used for ISUP call setup between SS7-based public switched telephone and SIP-based IP telephony networks. SIP-T 
carries an ISUP message payload in the body of a SIP message. Transporting ISUP in SIP bodies may provide 
opportunities for abuse, fraud, and privacy concerns, especially when SIP-T requests can be generated, inspected or 
modified during the travel in IP environment. The standard proposes that ISUP MIME bodies should be secured 
(preferably with S/MIME) to alleviate this concern. But MIME (as well as S/MIME) has certain disadvantages for 
real-time services as stated in [5]. 
In this paper MGC (Media Gateway Controller) and MG (Media Gateway) concept is also used for VoIP-PSTN 
interworking. MG converts media provided in one type of network to the format required in another type of network. 
MGC controls the parts of the call state that pertain to connection control for media channels in a MG. Interactions 
between MGC and MG are described in IETF and ITU joint standard H.248/Megaco [8]. 
Our solution will be showed on the PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario characteristic for SIP that is defined in [7]: SIP 
bridging. It means that the IP network (with SIP as a signalling protocol for VoIP) will be used only as a transport 
network – both caller and callee are in PSTN. This is a popular scenario for today's VoIP providers, which is also 
called toll-by-passing.  
 
4.1. DIGITAL WATERMARKING SCHEME MODIFICATIONS AND TOKEN CREATION 
Let us present the watermarking scheme (originally proposed in [1]) that will be also used here. Every Media 
Gateway (MG) is equipped with the functional block called Pre-processing Stage (PPS), see Fig. 2, which is 
responsible for preparing data before the watermark embedding stage. Its elements do the following.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Pre-processing stage block (PPS) in Media Gateway (MG) 
 
SB (Signalling Message Hash Buffer): stores hashes of signalling messages (or those fields that are not changed 
during transmission) from the first phase of the call provided from MGC (for ISUP and SIP protocols).  
VFE (Voice Feature Extractor): provides characteristic features (VF) of the original voice that is sent from PSTN 
network. Afterwards a hash can be also performed on this value. 
RNG (Randomizer): generates a random number R. We use it to provide a unique set of data for every embedded 
watermark.  
WD (Watermarking Data): in this block the input data is concatenated with R, IDX (unique, global identifier of one 
party of the connection), PASS (the password known to the both parties) and TS (time stamp).  
 
The embedded watermark formed as described above we will call a token. At the entrance and at the end of the IP 
network part of PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario the received token with a locally calculated, appropriate one. Fig. 3 shows, 
how the algorithm works for SIP protocol with SIP-T extension (to protect ISUP messages that are contained within 
SIP messages). It is SIP bridging scenario: the caller and callee are in PSTN and their communication is sent through 
IP network (MG sends RTP packets to the other Media Gateway). 
 
 Fig. 3. Proposed authentication solution operation for MG-MG connection 
 
In this situation, the values of the tokens AN and BN are: 
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PPSB block is analogous to PPSA in functioning. Additionally, we assume that in the initial signalling phase some of 
the signalling messages, for both signaling protocols: ISUP and SIP  (SMN means the N-th Signalling Message) were 
exchanged (and their hashes are stored in SB). In the second phase they are verified. H stands for the hash function 
and W for embedding of the digital watermark into audio. The algorithm works as follows: 
(1) When the conversation begins, the first voice sample enters VFEA block the feature of the voice sample 
(VFN) is extracted (for the data integrity) and then the hash function is performed on the result. 
(2) The values from SBA and VFEA are then XORed (they have the same length). Afterwards, the result is sent 
to WDA block, in which TokenA is created together with the other parameters like: the randomizer value (R), 
shared password (PASS), global identifier of A (IDA) and, optionally, the time stamp (TS). 
(3) TokenA is sent to the watermark embedding function and the information, that it contains, is saved there in 
the caller’s voice. Then, the data stream formed in this way is sent through the communication channel.  
(4) Before the voice from MG A can be processed by MG B, the watermark is extracted and sent to the 
comparator (C) on the receiver’s side.  
(5) From the extracted token, the randomizer value (R) is sent to the analogous PPSB block. In this block some 
pre-processing had taken place. If we have the R value, then we can compute TokenB. It should be equal to 
TokenA, if the transmission had not been tampered. The result is sent to the comparator (C). 
(6) In C both token values are compared.  
(7) If TokenA=TokenB, the special parameter LoT (Level of Trust) increases (it reflects a number of correct 
tokens received). Otherwise it decreases. Then, depending on LoT value the decision is made (by MGC), 
whether the call should be continued or broken down. Computation the LoT parameter is described in details in 
[1, 2]. 
(8) If MGC decides that the call can be continued, the voice sample finally can be converted to PSTN format 
and directed to callee. 
 
Thus, the authentication and integrity process depends on exchanging the security tokens and their comparison with 
the ones locally calculated at the receiver. It is essential to deal properly with every signalling messages exchanged 
during the connection. Those messages should not influence the call until they are authenticated and their integrity is 
verified. Authentication of messages, which are used to terminate VoIP conversations have to be treated the same as 
a normal message that comes during the call. Normally, the media channels are terminated, upon receiving this 
message. In our scheme it is vital to retain RTP flow until those messages are authenticated. 
As we mentioned earlier MGC and MG are vital for PSTN-VoIP interconnections. H.248/Megaco protocol was 
created for this purpose. Based on [8] we propose that MG uses Notify message to inform MGC that calculated and 
received tokens are the same or not. MGC should make a decision to continue or break a connection. Almost all the 
calculations are passed to MG, but MGC must perform a hash function on signalling messages (or on parts of them) 
that were exchanged during the first phase of the call (and later). Then MGC sends those hash values to be stored in 
MG. 
 
4.2. NETWORK STEGANOGRAPHY TO DISTINGUISH PARAMETERS 
Besides using digital watermarking in the IP part we will use network steganography to be able to send additional 
data as described in details in [2, 3]. In this way we will create a multipurpose covert channel. For IP network part 
we will use it generally for post authentication (as described in [3]). The general protocol overview is presented in 
the Fig. 4: 
 
Fig. 4. Using network steganography to distinguish parameters to send 
 
The size of the header of the PDU (Protocol Data Unit) shown in the Fig. 4 is small. In [3] it contained 6 bits that 
were entered in the unused IP/UDP/RTP fields in the certain way known to both sides of the communication. 
Moreover PDU can have one of two payload types: security or informational. How the informational parameters can 
be used freely to carry any data that is needed in the communication process e.g. they can be used to alternate RTCP 
protocol functionality as we showed in [2]. But more important here are the security payloads. That means that PDU 
contains certain authentication and/or integrity information that should be verified after its extraction form voice. 
Two kinds of security payloads are available, first is used to provide authentication and integrity of the voice, its 
source and signalling protocol messages (e.g. a token as described in 4.1). Second’s role is to provide post 
authentication for protocol parameters that were send earlier (both security and informational). That gives greater 
security of the whole digital stream and transmission. The general idea of its calculation is presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example of the post authentication of transmitted parameters 
As we see in the Fig. 5 there is a chaining between the transmitted parameters. Every n-th parameter is used for post 
authentication of n-1 parameters that were send earlier (For Fig. 4. n=4). 
 
5. THE PSTN PART OF PSTN-IP-PSTN SCENARIO  
To fulfill the requirements for proposed solution, special enhanced PSTN endpoint must be used. It must be capable 
of embedding/extraction watermark. We do not dictate watermarking technique that will be used in PSTN endpoint 
to embed watermark into voice – although it can be digital or analog watermarking scheme. The important thing is 
that the watermark that is created in the voice must survive AD/DA operation and embedding of different 
watermarks. For PSTN endpoint two modes are available: 
• It can embed watermark using analog watermarking technique. In this case the watermark must be 
characteristic for particular user. The watermark created must also reflect special features of conversation 
send as it was shown in case of IP part of PSTN-IP-PSTN connection. 
• It can convert analog voice into digital domain, embed analogous watermark as presented in Section III and 
then convert it again to analog signal and transmit through PSTN network. 
So at the endpoint the watermark is embedded and it is verified at the other end of PSTN-IP-PSTN connection ( 1  
and 3  in Fig.1). During the retrieving process the other PSTN user verifies only the watermark embedded by the 
caller. The other data (added during the traveling through the IP network part) is ignored. 
 
5. SECURITY SERVICES FOR PSTN-IP-PSTN SCENARIO 
Proposed solution as shown in Fig. 1, that uses watermarking technique and network steganography greatly improves 
security for PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario. In PSTN part it provides ( 1  and 3  in Fig.1): 
- Authentication of the data source (one can be sure of the identity of the caller), 
- Data authentication and integrity (one can be sure that the audio comes from the caller and it has not been 
tampered). 
 
Using our scheme in the IP network part (In Fig. 1 marked with 2 ) provides, besides mentioned above, following 
security services: 
- Authentication of the signalling messages for SIP and ISUP (one can prove that the caller is the source 
of the signalling messages that were exchanged during the signalling phase of the call),  
- Signalling messages integrity (one knows that the signalling messages were not modified during the 
transmission through the communication channel) , 
 
Additionally security provided in the IP part is enhanced with the use of post authentication parameter as described 
in 4.2. 
As we see with the use of proposed mechanism we can provide certain security services for voice communication 
between VoIP system and PSTN. Moreover security services provided in PSTN part are guaranteed in the end-to-end 
manner. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed lightweight PSTN-VoIP secure cooperation solution defines a useful mechanism that provides 
authentication and integrity of the voice traffic (both conversation and signaling messages) along the communication 
path. It takes advantage of two information hiding techniques: watermarking and network steganography, so it does 
not consume any user bandwidth. 
As showed in this paper it is suitable especially for PSTN-IP-PSTN scenario and it adjusts IP network part security 
to the PSTN level. We are able to verify authentication of both media streams as well as the signalling protocols used 
(ISUP, SIP).  In this way we gain one of the first security mechanisms that works in the heterogeneous environment 
for voice communication  
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